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CORRESPONDENCE
Law Without Mindt
Steven D. Smith*
Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious. 1

A large part of the work done by lawyers and judges involves the
interpretation of enacted law - primarily, statutes and the Constitution. Not surprisingly, legal scholars offer a good deal of advice,
usually unsolicited, about how the task of interpretation should be performed. At present, such scholarly advice commonly recommends
variations on an approach that may be called "present- oriented interpretation." This approach discourages judges from equating a law
with its historical meaning or "original understanding." Instead, it
urges them to construe statutes and constitutional provisions in a way
that will render the law "the best it can be" 2 in light of present needs
and values.
Of course, present-oriented interpretation also has its critics. One
objection asserts that the approach is really a disguise for something
else - for instance, that it is an excuse for judges (or law professors)
to interpolate their own values into law under the guise of "interpretation. "3 In this essay, however, I want to consider present-oriented
interpretation as what it purports to be. Thus, I will assume that the
approach would significantly and sufficiently constrain judges, that it is
not merely a device for reading the interpreter's values into law, and
that it offers a genuine alternative to other common methods or theot ©

1989 by Steven D. Smith
Professor of Law, University of Colorado. B.A. 1976, Brigham Young University; J.D.
1979, Yale Law School. - Ed. I thank Richard Collins, Kerry Macintosh, Robert Nagel, and
Pierre Schlag for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this essay. I also apologize to those
individuals for my failure to pursue some of their questions and suggestions. As they correctly
pointed out, the largely negative argument advanced here naturally generates a host of questions
about how judges should interpret enacted Jaw. My argument may also suggest additional candidates for the category of "mindless" Jaw; Pierre Schlag observes, for instance, that the jurisprudence of "original intent" may itself faJI into that category. But an attempt to address such issues
would require a full-blown theory of interpretation, and presenting such a theory (even if I had
one to present) would involve a major departure from my own "original intent"; i.e.. to write a
short essay that makes essentially only one critical point {albeit, I think, an important one).
I. Acts 17:22 (King James).
2. See infra notes 12-26 and accompanying text.
3. Among those who have asserted this criticism I include myself. See Smith, Why Should
Courts Obey the Law?, 77 GEO. L.J. 113, 158 (1988).
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ries of interpretation. I will argue that even taken on its own terms
(or, more accurately, especially if taken on its own terms), presentoriented interpretation is deeply flawed. Indeed, if present- oriented
interpretation could actually be all that its proponents claim it is, the
approach would be even less acceptable than if its critics' more skeptical depiction is correct.
The influence of the present-oriented approach is so pervasive that
even a footnote merely listing its numerous variations and proponents
might go on for pages. Rather than attempt any comprehensive treatment, I will focus on the positions of two important and articulate
proponents: Professors Ronald Dworkin and T. Alexander
Aleinikoff. 4 Nor will I attempt to survey the multitude of objections
and responses which even those two scholars are likely to provoke (or,
in Dworkin's case, have already provoked). Instead, I want to identify
what seems to me the central but generally overlooked flaw in presentoriented interpretation: the approach would make law the product
not of mind, but of accident.
I.
Present-oriented interpretation, though familiar enough, is also
strangely elusive. Perhaps the best way to understand the approach is
to examine what it shares, and what it does not share, with its leading
competitors. One competing view is commonly called "originalism,"
although Dworkin prefers to call it "historicism" or "speaker's meaning" interpretation, and Aleinikoff refers to it as the "archeological"
approach. 5 "Originalism" comes in several versions, 6 but its essential
contention is that in interpreting a statute or constitutional provision,
a judge should try to determine what the law meant, or was intended
to mean, at the time it was enacted. Originalists need not be J?,aive
about the difficulty of that task. Indeed, they may concede that it is
rarely possible to ascertain with certainty (and sometimes impossible
to ascertain at all) what a law was originally intended to mean, and
they differ in their prescriptions of what judges should do when dis4. Dworkin's approach to interpretation is presented in various books and articles but is most
cohesively explained in R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). Aleinikoff's proposal is presented
in Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988).
5. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 53-54, 359-61; Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 21.
6. Perhaps the most important distinction is between originalists who believe that interpretation should try to recapture the "Framers' intent" and those who favor interpretation focusing
on the original meaning of the text. See generally Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). The "intentionalist" and "textualist" versions may
have significantly different implications, but for purposes of this essay, those differences need not
be considered.
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cernible original meaning runs out. 7 Originalists can also concede that
statutes and constitutional provisions may sometimes adopt broad
principles which must be applied flexibly in light of current conditions. 8 Nonetheless, the quest for original meaning defines, in this
view, the essential function of legal interpretation.
A central concern of originalism is that judges be constrained by
the law rather than be left free to act according to their own lights, a
course that originalists regard as essentially lawless. Thus, the constraints imposed by originalist interpretation seek to realize within the
judicial branch the venerable ideal of "rule of law, not of men." If
"rule of law" denotes the approach's leading virtue, its principal perceived vice is captured in another slogan: "the dead hand of the past."
Even if the original understanding can be ascertained, critics contend,
adjudication that adheres to such an understanding will often be unresponsive to present values, concerns, and needs. Arguing that judges
should not feel unduly restricted by an enacting legislature's intent
even when that intent can be discerned, Aleinikoff asserts: "Law is a
tool for arranging today's social relations and expressing today's social
values; and we fully expect our laws, no matter when enacted, to speak
to us today. " 9
A very different approach to adjudication, if not exactly to "interpretation," is sometimes called (mostly by its opponents) "result-oriented" jurisprudence. Dworkin refers to this approach as
"pragmatism." As Dworkin describes it, the pragmatic approach
holds that ''judges do and should make whatever decisions seem to
them best for the community's future, not counting any form of consistency with the past as valuable for its own sake." 10 The pragmatic
judge would not necessarily spurn traditional legal authorities, like
statutes or constitutional provisions, in part because such authorities
may prove to be useful tools, and in part because they may in fact have
given rise to practices and expectations which the pragmatic calculus
7. Some originalists would argue that in such situations a judge must attempt to guess what
the enactors "would have intended" had they addressed the specific issue more directly. See R.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 286-87 (1985) (suggesting that the interpreter "should try to
put himself in the shoes of the enacting legislators and figure out how they would have wanted
the statute applied to the case before him"). Others would contend that when original or legal
meaning runs out, judges should fashion public policy according to their own best judgment. Cf.
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 17-22 (1977) (attributing a legal philosophy of this
kind to positivists such as H.L.A. Hart).
8. My colleague Richard Collins suggests - correctly, I suspect - that Dworkin's theory of
interpretation may be seductive in part because it can easily be confused with this kind of flexible
originalism. But see infra note 19.
9. Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 58 (emphasis added).
10. R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 95.
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must take into account. However, the judge would not acknowledge
(except as a "noble lie," for public consumption only) any "duty" to
obey a statute for its own sake, and would respect the statute only for
its prospective usefulness. 11
The principal virtues and vices of pragmatism are just the reverse
of those attributed to originalism. Whereas originalism is arguably
unresponsive to present needs and values, pragmatism is exclusively
concerned with the present and the future; past legal authorities are
relevant, if at all, only insofar as they implicate current concerns.
Conversely, by freeing judges of the duty to obey enacted law, pragmatism dissolves the constraints constructed by originalism; it authorizes
the judge to disregard an applicable statute or precedent whenever the
claims of current policy so advise. In short, pragmatism promises responsiveness but not, arguably, "law"-like constraint.
Dissatisfied with both originalism and pragmatism, present-oriented interpretation seeks to appropriate the virtues of each. Like
originalism, it would restrict judges to "interpretation," thus forbidding free-wheeling judicial forays into the realm of policy creation.
But the aim of interpretation would no longer be primarily historical.
Instead, as in pragmatism, judges would become distinctly presentminded, interpre~ing the law to conform to present needs and values.
In this spirit, Aleinikoff urges the judge to "treat the statute as if it had
been enacted yesterday and try to make sense of it in today's world." 12
This approach prescribes "textual analysis" - but analysis "in a present-minded fashion."13
To illustrate the method, Aleinikoff discusses an immigration law
enacted in 1952 which excludes, among other persons, "[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or a mental defect." 14
Aleinikoff asks whether this provision should be construed to prohibit
immigration by aliens who are homosexuals. When the statute was
enacted in 1952, he observes, Congress almost certainly believed that
the language covered homosexuals. The statute was enacted pursuant
to a comprehensive study of the immigration system by the Senate
Judiciary Committee, which had recommended the exclusion of
"homosexuals and other sex perverts." And the Senate Report accompanying the immigration bill had explicitly noted that "[t]he Public Health Service has advised that the provisions for the exclusion of
11. See generally id. at 154-60 (elaborating Dworkin's conception of pragmatic decision
making).
12. Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 49 (emphasis in original).
13. Id. at 47 n.117.
14. Id. at 48 (quoting 66 Stat. 163, 182 (1952)).
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aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality or a mental defect ... is
sufficiently broad to provide for the exclusion of homosexuals and sex
perverts." 15 Nonetheless, Aleinikoff goes on to explain how a presentminded interpreter could construe the provision not to cover homosexuals. The interpreter, he suggests, "ought to begin by noticing that the
statute nowhere mentions homosexuality, and the phrase 'psychopathic personality' does not spring to mind as a ready category into
which to place it." 16 In addition, interpreting the statute not to exclude homosexuals is consistent with what Aleinikoff regards as the
more pertinent and sound legal practices of today, as well as with "the
accepted view of the medical and psychiatric professions." 17 Thus, a
construction that declines to apply the statute to homosexuals,
although it concededly "violate[s] the clearly expressed intent of the
enacting legislators," 18 is faithful both to present values and to the
statutory text.
Although Dworkin's theory of interpretation is more elaborate and
thus more difficult to pin down 19 - indeed, his responses to criticism
suggest that his critics have never yet quite managed to pin him down
his theory is closely analogous in essential respects to
Aleinikoff's. 20 Where Aleinikoff insists on textual analysis, Dworkin
demands interpretive "fit." The judge cannot just do whatever she
15. Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 47 (quoting S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., !st Sess. 9 (1951)).
16. Id. at 50.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 51.
19. One possible source of confusion may be noted here and, hopefully, avoided. In Dworkin's view, interpretation, while it does not aim primarily to recapture the framers' or enactors'
intent, does give some weight to what legislators have said about the law they enacted; and there
are passages in Dworkin, especially in his earlier writing, that if taken in isolation might even
suggest that Dworkin advocates a kind of originalism in which the interpreter is bound by the
general principle or concept adopted by the enactors rather than by their specific conception. See,
e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 135-36. If this were Dworkin's position, then he would be
advancing a particular version of originalism or the speaker's meaning theory of interpretation,
rather than a criticism of and an alternative to that theory; in that case, this essay's analysis of
present-oriented interpretation would not apply to Dworkin. But it is clear that Dworkin is not
merely offering an improved version of originalism. Indeed, in his recent book he describes the
theory of originalism just noted and expressly rejects it. Dworkin explains how Hercules, a
mythical judge who begins by favoring originalism and then is forced by difficulties and criticism
to modify his approach, might eventually conclude that he should "enforce the most abstract and
general political convictions from which legislators act rather than the hopes or expectations or
more detailed political opinions they have in mind when voting." R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at
317. Such a view is at least very close to the version of originalism that Dworkin's discussion of
"concepts" and "conceptions" might seem to endorse. But Dworkin promptly dismisses this
view, observing that it is "only a poorly stated and unstable form of Hercules' own method, into
which it therefore collapses." Id.
20. Aleinikoff observes that his own "approach is similar [to Dworkin's], although it is less
concerned with Dworkin's dimension of 'fit' (that is, the telling of a story that harmonizes earlier
interpretations into a coherent whole)." Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 47 n.117. Aleinikoff's reference is to Dworkin's "chain novel" analogy. See infra note 24.
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pleases, or whatever strikes her as sensible or fair; she must confine
herself to "interpreting" the law. And a proper interpretation must
"fit," or be consistent with, the text or practice that is the object of
interpretation. 21 Similarly, where Aleinikoff urges the interpreter to
be "present-minded," Dworkin requires ''justification." By this
Dworkin means that the interpreter should select the interpretation
most compatible with current values and with the best available political and ethical theory. 22 Thus, the object of interpretation is to make
the law "the best it can be" by present standards. 23 This presentist
orientation rejects, or at least greatly de-emphasizes, the quest for
framers' or authors' intent - a quest that Aleinikoff and Dworkin
respectively belittle with the labels of "archeology" and
"historicism. " 24
By combining elements of both competing approaches, proponents
of present- oriented interpretation hope to capture the virtues of those
competitors while avoiding their debilitating vices. Present-oriented
adjudication would be constrained, and thus "lawful," because judges
would be confined to "interpretation." Aleinikoff insists that his recommended approach is "not nontextual . . . . [T]he fact that the statute is written . . . provides a significant restraint. " 25 Likewise,
Dworkin emphasizes that Hercules, his mythical ideal judge, cannot
just render any decision that he regards as fair or desirable; the requirement of "fit" may eliminate results that Hercules might have preferred. 26 At the same time, because interpretation seeks conformity
not with historical meaning or intent, but rather with present values
and needs, it would be responsive to current concerns.
21. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 66, 230, 338-39, 380.
22. Id. at 231, 350, 380.
23. Id. at 52, 62, 337.
24. See supra note 5. Dworkin and Aleinikoff offer captivating analogies to explain their
recommended approach. Dworkin uses the analogy of the "chain novel." In interpreting a statute or constitutional provision, a judge is like a writer involved in a multi-member project in
which one author writes the first chapter of a novel, then passes it on to another author who will
write the second chapter, and so on. The judge does not write on a clean slate; his product must
maintain continuity with the chapters already written by his predecessors. With that qualification, however, the judge must write his own chapter as well as he can, rather than guessing what
earlier authors might have expected him to do. R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 228-38.
Aleinikoff employs a "nautical" metaphor for statutory interpretation. "Congress builds a
ship and charts its initial course, but the ship's ports-of-call, safe harbors and ultimate destination may be a product of the ship's captain, the weather, and other factors not identified at the
time the ship sets sail." Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 21. In this view, the "dimensions and structure of the craft determine where it is capable of going, but the current course is set primarily by
the crew on board." Id.
25. Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 60.
26. R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 379-80.
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II.
As presented by its supporters, present- oriented interpretation
seems well-nigh irresistible. By incorporating the virtues of its competitors, the approach offers us the best of both worlds. Or does it?
Start with the question of constraining judges. As noted, proponents of present- oriented interpretation claim that the approach
would place significant constraints on judges. One objection, which I
will simply note and then set aside, contends that this claim is false;
the requirement of "fit" is so loose that the judge will usually be
presented with a virtual smorgasbord of eligible interpretations, and
she will be able to select an interpretation that suits her own moral and
political tastes. Thus, present- oriented interpretation is nothing more
than closet pragmatism. 27 This is an important criticism, but for the
moment I want to assume that it is unfounded; i.e., that present-oriented interpretation would significantly constrain judges. 28 Taken on
its own terms, present- oriented interpretation provokes an even more
fundamental objection.
That objection can best be presented in stages. Begin by considering more closely the notion of "constraint." It is true that originalism
values "constraint," but not just any kind of constraint. Judges might
be "constrained," after all, by a rigid requirement that all cases be
decided in favor of the party whose surname has alphabetical priority. 29 Or, if reading the entrails of birds were reduced to a method
that produced uniform results, we might severely constrain judges by
insisting that they decide cases according to that method. Such requirements would "constrain," but they would not thereby possess
even the slightest appeal. Nor has it ever seemed a cogent response to
those who, like the Legal Realists, argue that law is indeterminate, to
say: "Aha, you contradict yourselves! First you say that the judge has
wide discretion, but then you turn around and admit that the judge is
constrained - by what he ate for breakfast."
If such an argument seems fatuous, that is because the point worth
27. Roscoe Pound expressed such a view with a metaphor that was less complimentary than
Dworkin's "chain novel" analogy or Aleinikolf's "nautical" metaphor; Pound chose the metaphor of the juggler or sleight-of-hand artist. He condemned "spurious interpretation" whose
object is "to make, unmake, or remake and not merely to discover. It puts a meaning into the
text as a juggler puts coins ... into a dummy's hair, to be pulled forth presently with an air of
discovery." Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 CoLUM. L. REV. 379, 382-83 (1907).
28. For those who find the criticism persuasive, therefore, much of the following discussion
will have a distinctly hypothetical character. Neither the advantages claimed by proponents of
present-oriented interpretation nor the difficulties which I will describe will seem real, since constrained present-oriented interpretation will be regarded as merely illusory anyway.
29. Cf. B. CURRIE, SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 609 (1963) (ironically
proposing a similar rule of decision for choice-of-law cases).
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discussing deals not with the existence of "constraints" in the abstract,
but with whether the law can impose the proper kind of constraints.
And what is the proper kind of constraint? At this point, the contrast
between originalism and present-oriented interpretation is subtle but
critically important. Both the originalist and the presentist may offer
seemingly identical answers: the judge is properly constrained by
"statutes" and by the Constitution; i.e., by enacted law. But these answers are in reality quite different because when the positions speak of
"statutes," or enacted law, they mean different things.
Just as "man" can be defined as a "featherless biped," a "rational
animal," or "the offspring of deity" - and each of these divergent
definitions might conceivably be correct - so a statute can be understood in critically different ways. Viewed one way, a statute or constitutional provision is just a collection of words - words with a special
diction and tone, perhaps, but in the end not all that different from the
words one might find in a technical treatise, a law review article, or
even a science fiction novel. The same collection of words that appears in a statute might be written by anybody - a doodling political
hack, a scribbling reformer, a law student practicing legal drafting without acquiring any special credentials or claim to legal authority.
Viewed another way, however, the statute is not just a collection of
words, but rather the expression of a collective decision: a decision
made by the established political authority and expressed in a form
recognized as conferring legal force and validity upon the decision. In
maintaining that judges should be constrained by statutes, originalism
adopts this latter view of what a statute is. Originalism, in other
words, insists that judges should be constrained to obey enacted law
not because constraint is good for its own sake, nor because there is
anything magical about the way words are arranged in a statute, but
because a judicial obligation to obey enacted law is the means by
which the power of the political community to make effective group
decisions is realized.
The whole thrust of present- oriented interpretation, by contrast, is
to reject or resist a view which understands statutes primarily as the
expression of particular decisions made by specific, temporally situated political officials. On the contrary, the presentist insists that to be
bound by the statute does not entail being bound by the actual human
understanding or collective decision that brought the statute into being. But this view effectively separates the statute from the source of
its authority. To be sure, the words of the enacted law may continue
to constrain the judge. But the essential fact that made those words
(and not a science fiction novel, or even a law review article) effica-
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cious to bind the judge -i.e., the fact that the words express a specific
collective decision made by the designated political authority - is
now de- emphasized or dismissed. The legal text is methodically dissociated from the phenomenon upon which its power to constrain
depends.
The important question that emerges from this new perspective is
not whether the statute, so viewed, could constrain judicial choice.
Perhaps it could. But the critical question is why a statute, so understood, should constrain judges. If the statute is understood not as
the expression of a collective decision by the established political authority but rather as a kind of thing-in-itself, a free-floating text, then
why is its right to command any greater than that of, say, the political
treatise or the science fiction novel?
The point is easy to miss, or to misperceive, in part because we
suspect that the severing of the statutory words from the human understanding that initially produced them is never completely effective.
To be sure, we can· hypothesize a situation in which words come to
mean something totally different from what they were originally intended or understood to mean. But it is questionable whether in the
law such a drastic transformation ever really occurs. It seems that
something - the ingrained habits and perspectives of the legal profession, perhaps, or the continuity of language, or the obstinate underlying nature of humanity or of the cosmos - will ensure that legal
words uttered decades ago will continue to carry for us something like
the meaning they held for those who first spoke them. Hence, the
status of words in a statute never quite degenerates to the level of
words in a science fiction novel; the senselessness of severing words
from the understanding that produced them, and then of treating
those words as authoritative constraints, never fully appears.
But it would be unseemly for a proponent of present- oriented interpretation to take refuge in the observation that presentist interpretations will probably correspond pretty closely to the original meaning
anyway. After all, the presentist proposal offers a meaningful alternative to originalism only insofar as present interpretations do depart
from original understanding. Insofar as continuity obtains, such that
original understanding and present interpretation coincide in their
conclusions, the presentist attack on originalism is a mere academic
exercise without practical consequence. Hence, the essential presentist
contention is - and must be - that at least in some instances original
understanding and present-minded interpretation will substantially diverge, and that when such divergences appear, the present-oriented
interpretation should prevail over the original understanding. And in
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assessing this proposal, we should struggle to suspend our sense of
inevitable continuity, and to judge the proposal by the stark case in
which present-minded interpretation produces a result wholly contrary to the statute's original meaning and intent. In that (perhaps
imaginary) case, the severing of the statutory words from the understanding and decision that produced the words is complete; the
statutory words become a disembodied artifact, not the expression of a
discrete collective decision.
Viewed in this way, the words of a statute have no more authority
to constrain than do the words of a science fiction novel. In neither
case are the words treated as expressing an actual, conscious decision
of the political community or its established authorities. And in both
cases, therefore, the pertinent question is not whether the words can
constrain, but rather why in the world they should.
Ill.

Present-o.riented interpretation, it seems, fails to achieve the objective of originalism; it constrains judges, perhaps, but it does not constrain them to respect collective decisions actually made by the
political community. Neither does present-oriented interpretation realize the objectives of pragmatism. It counsels judges to be presentminded. But the judges' ability to promote present values and objectives will be hampered by the requirement that they confine themselves to "interpreting." Thus, Dworkin assures us that in some cases
Hercules will not be able to reach the result that current values or
theories of justice would prescribe because that result would require an
interpretation that does not plausibly "fit" enacted law and established
practice. Jo
To the pragmatist, such a limitation must seem like pure, irrational
traditionalism; the limitation insists upon loyalty to the past even
when that loyalty serves no present purpose. 31 Hence, just as presentoriented interpretation may appear to the originalist to be closet pragmatism, to the pragmatist it may seem a kind of closet originalism.
But the equation is imperfect. In fact, the present-minded judge faces
a predicament which is worse in one way than that which confronts
the originalist.
30. See supra text accompanying note 26.
31. As noted above, a pragmatic orientation may supply reasons for applying statutes and
constitutional provisions, and it may even provide reasons for construing the text according to its
meaning in present ordinary usage. Insofar as parties have actually formed expectations and
have acted in reliance upon their understanding of the text, for example, a pragmatic judge devoted to doing present justice might be more concerned with the parties' understanding of the
text than with the enactors' understanding. See Smith, supra note 3, at 136.
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Suppose the pragmatist poses the following challenge: Let us assume that in a given case, result A would be the "best" result as measured by present values and needs; it would be the fairest result, or the
result that best promotes sound public policies. But result A cannot
be squared with any plausible interpretation of an apparently controlling statute, which was enacted some decades ago. Instead, by all
plausible interpretations, the statute appears to command result B,
which runs contrary to current notions of fairness and to public policies that are now widely accepted (though not, of course, reflected in
the older statute pertinent to this case). 32 In such a situation, it seems,
both originalism and present-oriented interpretation would require the
judge to choose result B. But what sense is there, the pragmatist demands, in such a course? Indeed, to argue for such a conclusion seems
almost self-contradictory, like arguing that it is better to choose the
worse result.
The pragmatist's challenge may be embarrassing for either the
originalist or the present-minded interpreter. But the originalist at
least has a plausible response. Interpreting enacted laws according to
the understanding of those who adopted them is a way of conferring
upon the political community the power to make collective decisions.
T9 be sure, those collective decisions may sometimes be misguided, or
they may become outdated. In such cases, originalist interpretation
may inhibit judges from promoting present interests and values; a
judge may be forced to respect a past decision, and thus to reach result
B even though result A is admittedly more consistent with present
values. The originalist can argue, however, that this is a cost worth
bearing in order to preserve the power of collective self-determination.
By contrast, how does the proponent of present-oriented interpretation respond to the pragmatist's challenge? Having already divorced
statutory meaning from the legislative understanding or intent that
produced the statute, she cannot now argue that result B is required
on the basis of respect for a collective community decision. For all she
knows, such a result is not in any meaningful sense required by an
actual, conscious decision. Or, to put it differently, the presentminded judge would feel perfectly free to reach result A if exactly the
same original collective decision had been expressed in different language which, with the passage of time and the evolution of values and
32. Of course, in practice the ability of a judge to say with any confidence that result A is
preferable to result B, despite the legislature's thus far unaltered decision to the contrary, is
questionable. Thus, an originalist might well reject the hypothetical altogether on the ground
that by assuming that result A is known to be best, the hypothetical adopts an assumption that
will rarely if ever obtain in the real world.
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language, could now plausibly be read to support that result. For the
presentist, the obstacle to reaching the pragmatically "best" result is
grounded not in the collective decision, but rather in the words: the
present-minded interpreter cannot reach the desirable result because
the legislature happened to use words that cannot be read to support
that result. She is inhibited from realizing present justice not by a
decision made by conscious human beings, but instead by an inanimate text. 33
IV.
This conclusion suggests that the criticisms discussed thus far are
merely preliminary. For example, a moment ago I asserted that present-oriented interpretation, by severing the legal text from the understanding of the officials who produced and adopted that text, cuts
the connection between the text and the political authority to which
the text owes its power to constrain. But it now appears that this objection understates the problem. Present- oriented interpretation not
only cuts the connection between text and political authority; it severs
the link between text and mind. The interpretations rendered and the
results reached by presentist judges will turn (at least in those cases
where the method of present-oriented interpretation makes a difference) less on mind- on conscious human thought expressed through
actual decisions - than on historical accident.
Aleinikoff's discussion of immigration law provides a valuable example of just this kind of accident. As Aleinikoff presents the situation, it is as clear as such things can be that the enacting Congress
intended to prohibit immigration by homosexual aliens and used language that, in Congress' understanding, expressed that decision. But
it is also true that three- and-a-half decades later the language chosen
by Congress would probably not be commonly understood as referring
to homosexuality; if a statute employing such language actually had
33. Nor do the "nautical" and "chain novel" metaphors, see supra note 24, have much force
to deflect the pragmatist's challenge. In response to the "nautical" metaphor, the pragmatist can
simply ask, "What sense does it make to stay on board a ship that is not, at least in this instance,
taking us where we want to go?" Likewise, the pragmatist can dismiss the "chain novel" metaphor as manifestly inapposite to the judge's task. After all, the only reason why the writer of a
later chapter in a chain novel has a responsibility to maintain continuity with earlier chapters is
that he is involved in producing a work that is intended to be, and will be, read as a whole;
readers normally do not pick out chapters in the middle and read them without reading what
came before and what comes after. But the judge may be dealing with persons who know little
(and care less) about what the law was like decades ago; those persons are concerned that the law
be "the best it can be" now. Past chapters of the legal story had their own readers, of course, but
those readers are long since dead. In short, it is not at all clear why the "chain novel" analogy
has any relevance for judges. In this respect, the analogy of the business manager, for whom
what happened last year is a "sunk cost," seems more apt.
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been enacted yesterday (as Aleinikoff asks us to suppose of the real
statute), we probably would not read it as excluding homosexuals. A
nonexclusionary construction, Aleinikoff goes on to say, is more consistent with present pertinent legal practice than is a construction adhering to the original legislative intent. Thus, a judge can promote
present values and preferred legal practices while remaining faithful to
the statutory text (though not, Aleinikoff concedes, to the understanding of the enacting legislature).34
Aleinikoff 's assertions about historical intent and current usage
seem plausible enough. The trouble is not with what Aleinikoff says,
but with what he fails to say: i.e., that his analysis makes everything
hinge on an historical accident. When it enacted the statute, Congress
used words that were evidently understood as referring to, among
other things, homosexuality. Congress might just as easily have said
"homosexuality"; it did not use that precise word only because it apparently believed that it had used a somewhat more inclusive but essentially synonymous term. If Congress had used the word
"homosexuality," then Aleinikoff's construction would collapse; a
present-minded interpreter could no longer "begin by noticing that the
statute nowhere mentions homosexuality."35 On the contrary, even if
enacted yesterday, a statute so worded would clearly cover homosexuals, and the homosexual alien would apparently be out of luck. But
because Congress happened to use different words to express the same
decision, a diametrically opposite result obtains. The alien's fortunes
turn on a fortuity.
The difficulty is hardly unique to Aleinikoff 's particular illustration. Legislators, like other human beings, can often express the same
idea in more than one way. In many situations, therefore, at least two
ways of expressing a public decision may, at the time of enactment,
seem almost synonymous; the formulation that is in fact .chosen will
depend largely upon stylistic preferences, or upon mere chance. Years
later, however, the possible readings of those alternative formulations
may come to diverge. To the originalist, the enactors' choice of formulations should in principle make no difference because the judge is
expected to implement the statute according to its original meaning,
not its meaning at the time of subsequent application. Neither will the
choice of formulations have great significance for the pragmatist,
though for a different reason; seeking to further present interests, the
34. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text. It should be noted that Aleinikoff's con·
clusion, though neither his reasoning nor his particular version of present-oriented interpreta·
tion, might be compatible both with pragmatism and with some versions of originalism.
35. Aleinikolf, supra note 4, at 50.
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pragmatist will not feel bound to obey the statute, however it happens
to be worded. 36 But if one "treat[s] the statute as if it were enacted
yesterday"37 and then, with that fictitious qualification, continues to
insist on respect for the text, the different formulations may have
vastly different legal consequences. Thus, for the present-minded interpreter the enactors' choice of formulations - a choice that may
have turned largely on chance - proves to be dispositive.
In this respect, present- oriented interpretation presents a striking
contrast to both originalism and pragmatism. In those views, the law ·
evolves out of discrete acts of mind; it is the product of human beings
who deliberate about problems and then make conscious decisions
about how those problems may best be addressed. The locus of such
acts of mind differs as between the theories. The originalist assigns
responsibility primarily to legislators, who ordinarily make and express their decisions in the form of statutes. The pragmatist, conversely, encourages judges to decide what policies and results will
advance justice and public policy. In either case, however, law
originates with, and is developed by, acts of mind.
Present-oriented interpretation, by contrast, makes law substantially the product of historical· accident. To be sure, legislators continue to study problems and make decisions - decisions that are
expressed in statutes. But the whole point of present-oriented interpretation's attack on "historicism" and "archeology" is to cut the tie
between the legislative intent, or the legislators' understanding of what
they have decided, and the statute itself. The connection between the
statute and the act of mind that produced it is thus in large measure
dissolved. 38 Likewise, judges will continue to consider cases and
render decisions. But the whole point of the presentists' attack on
pragmatism is that a judge must not simply study a problem and then
render the decision that seems most just or useful. Instead, the judge
is supposed to reach a decision by the distinctly different process of
"interpreting" statutes - statutes which the presentist has deliberately and methodically unmoored from the acts of mind in which they
originated.
The result comes close to achieving, at least in aspiration, a law
that is in the most literal sense "mindless." Of course, the law would
36. Of course, to the extent that the original choice of wording has influenced present practices and expectations, the pragmatist's decision will be indirectly affected by the legislature's
initial choice.
37. Aleinikolf, supra note 4, at 49 (emphasis omitted).
38. Cf. R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 316 ("[Hercules] takes note of the statements the
legislators made in the process of enacting [a statute], but he treats them as political events
important in themselves, not as evidence of any mental state behind them.").
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still be the product of mental processes, just as decisions based on interpreting astrological configurations or on reading palms or tea leaves
are the result of (perhaps very intricate) mental processes. But such
decisions are not, at least not in the most important sense, based on
"mind." Similarly, when statutes are understood as "texts" but not as
the expression of actual, conscious, temporally situated decisions, the
connection to "mind" is cut; the statute becomes a kind of Rorschach
blot; it constrains-there are thousands of things that an observer just
· can't see in a Rorshach blot-but its contraints are fortuitous, not the
product of conscious deliberation. And the critical question, more
vexing now than in its earlier appearances, is not whether such a statute can guide judges, but whether there is any conceivable reason why
it should. A person might search for answers to vital personal questions in a Rorschach blot; he might even.find answers there. But who
wants to turn his life over to a Rorschach blot?

v.
Until the early thirteenth century, those indicted were put to an ordeal.
In the ordeal of'Water, for example, a priest would conjure the water not
to accept a liar, the accused would swear to his innocence, and then he
would be lowered in: if he floated his oath was shown to be perjured,
and he was therefore guilty of the offence. The whole mechanism turned
upon the invocation of the priest; and after long and anxious inquiry, the
church in 1215 decided that it was all superstition and forbade priests to
take any part. The decree was promptly obeyed in England, and the
mode of trial of centuries was brought to an end. 39

The elimination of trial by ordeal is regarded as an important advance in the development of law. But that specific advance was only
part of a larger achievement by which law has come to be seen as the
product not of natural or historical fortuity, but of mind. 40 More
than seven centuries after the abolition of the ordeal, however, the
widespread appeal of present-oriented interpretation suggests that this
larger achievement remains insecure. Ironically, perhaps, the achievement seems especially insecure among legal scholars.
At this point it may be reassuring to recall an objection that I earlier noted and set aside. The objection asserted that present-oriented
interpretation is really just a disguised form of something else, that it
is really just closet originalism or closet pragmatism. As it turns out,
there is comfort in the supposition that present- oriented interpretation
39. S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS 01' THE COMMON LAW 358-59 {1969).
40. For a valuable exploration of the importance of "mind" in law, see J, VINING, THE
AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN (1986).
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is not what it purports to be. Letting legislators make collective decisions has its risks, after all, but there is much to be said for such a
system. Letting judges fashion the law according to their understanding of justice and sound public policy may be even more worrisome;
still, arguments favoring that kind of system are also available. But it
is hard to think of any recommendation for a regime of law created by
the "interpretation" of disembodied words that have been methodically severed from the acts of mind that produced them. Such a regime would represent a step back in the direction of the rule of
fortuity.

